Psychological Egoism |
Two arguments for psychological egoism: |
First argument |
Premises |
If we always do what we most want to do, then we can never act unselfishly. |
We always do what we most want to do. |
Conclusion |
Therefore, we can never act unselfishly. |
Rebuttal |
Rachels claims that this fails because the second premise is not true. |
Blizek claims that it's misleading; what we most want to do is what we wind up doing, otherwise it wouldn't be what we did. He claims that the first premise is the problem. |
So the difference is more like: we wind up doing what is our highest priority, even if that is not necessarily what we would enjoy. |
This argument fails if we can find one counterexample, in which someone acts in an unselfish manner. Blizek says that we do have these examples, therefore this fails as we have direct counterexamples of people acting without selfish motives. |
Also: sometimes what people most want in fact coincides with what is unselfish. |
Second argument |
Premises |
If we always get satisfaction from the things we do, then we can never act unselfishly. |
We always get satisfaction from what we do. |
Conclusion |
Therefore, we can never act unselfishly. |
Rebuttal |
Second premise is acceptable so long as satisfaction means having what you want fulfilled, not a gloating superiority, a smug feeling. |
But we can get something for ourselves and still be acting unselfishly. Therefore, the first premise is not true and the argument is not valid. |
The deepest failing of psychological egoism: |
People believe what they want to believe. People who assume psychological egoism can always find a selfish motive for everything that we do, even the unselfish actions and motives. |